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Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he became the fifth UK leader to occupy the position over a six-year span.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified unprecedented political turmoil. So what term captures what is occurring in France, now on its sixth premier in two years – with three in the past 10 months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, in the best case, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Key background: ever since Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – the left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and deficit are now almost twice the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the following day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a respectful address, he blamed political intransigence, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job virtually unworkable.

A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two ex-prime ministers openly criticized the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down all future administrations unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, however, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS explicitly warned that it would be demanding further compromises. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR seek his removal.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by some miracle, the divided parliament musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the prospects for the government beyond that look grim.

So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his successor would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that transformation will not be possible under the country’s current constitution. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”